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RISING TEMPERATURES, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, AND
PUBLIC NUISANCES: THE SECOND CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON
THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE IN CONNECTICUT
V AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States House of Representatives' passage of the
Waxman-Markey Act, which sought to limit the nation's overall
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through a cap-and-trade system,
led many environmentalists to hope the federal government would
finally address the threat posed by climate change.' Those hopes
were shattered less than a year later when Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid stopped pursuing the cap-and-trade legislation upon realizing he could not muster the filibuster-proof majority needed for
passage. 2 Due to Congress's failure to substantively address global
warming and the bleak prospects of any comprehensive legislation,
concerned citizens have begun searching for alternate routes to reduce the nation's GHG emissions. 3 Recently, some states and environmental groups have initiated litigation against large GHG
1. SeeJohn M. Broder, House Backs Bill, 219-212, to Curb Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2009, at Al (documenting House's passage of Waxman-Markey
Act). The objective of the bill was to reduce greenhouse gases in the United States
by 17 % from their 2005 levels by the year 2020, and 83 % by the year 2050. Id.
While some environmentalists had problems with the bill's concessions to the coal
industry and other special interests, prominent environmental groups, including
the Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, and World Wildlife Fund, supSept.
ported it. The Cap-and-TradeBill: Waitingfor the OtherShoe to Drop, ECONoMIsT,
44
19395 (noting
12, 2009, at 83, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1
compromises that environmentalists were willing to make). In response to the
House's passage of Waxman-Markey, the American Petroleum Institute (an oil industry trade group) funded a campaign by an organization called Energy Citizens.
Id. This organization sponsored rallies to protest the climate change bill in a
handful of American cities. Id.
2. See America's Climate Policy: Capped, EcONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 50, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/166932 9 3 (explaining Senator Reid's decision to remove GHG cap-and-trade bill from Senate agenda due to insufficient
support from members). "With the mid-term elections sure to swing heavily away
from Mr. Reid's Democrats, there is now no possibility of comprehensive climatechange legislation in America for years." Id.
3. See Climate-ChangePolicy: Let it Be, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 69, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/16693691 (observing that after cap-and-trade
legislation died in Senate, groups desiring to reduce emissions have identified alternate strategies). In lieu of federal legislation, some of the methods environmental groups plan on using to reduce GHG emissions include lobbying the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean
Air Act and encouraging individual states to implement their own cap-and-trade
schemes. Id.

(321)
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emitters under the tort theory of public nuisance. 4 Given the
widely perceived lack of meaningful political action regarding
global warming, such litigation may be one of the best available
tools for addressing climate change for the foreseeable future.5

Nevertheless, climate change litigation is very controversial. 6
Considering the partisan debate surrounding the issue and the
problem's truly global scope, it should come as no surprise that the
political question doctrine has emerged as an obstacle for climate
change litigants. 7 All four global warming cases filed to date against
industry defendants-car manufacturers, oil and gas producers,
and electrical utilities-were initially dismissed as nonjusticiable political questions. 8

In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (American Electric),9
the Second Circuit rejected the application of the political question
doctrine, opening a path for climate change actions to be adjudicated on their merits.10 In American Electric, eight states, New York
City, and three land trusts sued six of the nation's largest electric

power companies that operated fossil fuel-fired plants in twenty different states." The plaintiffs sought an abatement of the companies' alleged ongoing contributions to the public nuisance of global
4. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266-68
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (asserting public nuisance claim against power plant emissions);
Californiav. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 M1J, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (filing claim against automakers for contributing to public
nuisance of global warming); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (pursuing tort-based climate change
litigation).
5. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-so-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1, 6 (2003) (explaining how public
nuisance actions could provide viable method for reducing GHG emissions in current political environment where climate change legislation is unlikely in foreseeable future).
6. See Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigationand the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENv-rL. L. 79, 85 (2008) (observing controversy
surrounding tort-based climate change litigation).
7. See Maria V. Gillen, The Rebirth of the Political Question Doctrine, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23, 23 (2008) (discussing how political question doctrine has
obstructed climate change litigation).
8. See id. (noting that climate change lawsuits based on public nuisance were
dismissed by district courts as presenting nonjusticiable political questions).
9. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
10. See Tom Mounteer, Returning the Common Law to its Rightful Place, 40
ENvrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYsis 10361, 10361 (2010) (commenting that American
Electric reopened possibility of utilizing public nuisance actions to address climate
change).
11. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 316-17 (2d Cir.
2009) (discussing facts and procedural posture of case).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss2/6

2

Schiraldi: Ring Temperatures, Political Questions, and Public Nuisances: The

2011]

RISING TEMPERATURES

323

warming. 12 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the claim as a nonjusticiable political question, but
the Second Circuit reversed on appeal.' 3 After an extensive analysis, the court held that the plaintiffs' action did not implicate the
political question doctrine and permitted the case to proceed to
the merits stage.' 4
This Note will analyze the Second Circuit's treatment of the
political question doctrine in American Electric, along with the decision's implications for future climate change litigation.' 5 Part II of
this Note provides the case's factual background, the parties' primary arguments regarding the political question issue, and the
court's holding.' 6 In Part III, this Note explains the legal background of the Second Circuit's resolution of this issue by discussing
the political question doctrine test and how courts have applied it
in various factual contexts.' 7 Part IV outlines the reasoning the Second Circuit utilized to arrive at its holding on the political question
issue. 18 Part V critically examines the court's analysis and conclusions.' 9 Finally, Part VI discusses the potential impact of American
Electric on the ability of future climate change litigants to overcome
the justiciability barrier that has previously derailed such lawsuits. 20
II.

FACTS

The Second Circuit's decision in American Electric arose out of a
lawsuit filed in July 2004 by eight states-California, Connecticut,
Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin-the city of New York, and three private land trusts against six
utility and service companies in the electric power industry.2 1 The
12. See id. at 318 (explaining relief sought by plaintiffs).
13. See id. at 315 (holding that political question doctrine does not apply to
plaintiffs' claims and vacating judgment of district court).
14. See id. at 314-15 (providing brief overview of case's factual background
and major issues).
15. For a description of the Second Circuit's application of the political question doctrine, see infra notes 110-53 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the facts of American Electric, see infra notes 2139 and accompanying text.
17. For an explanation of the applicable legal background surrounding American Electric, see infra notes 40-109 and accompanying text.
18. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's decision, see infra notes
110-53 and accompanying text.
19. For a critical analysis of the court's holding in American Electric on the
political question issue, see infra notes 154-208 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the potential impact of American Electric, see
infra notes 20948 and accompanying text.
21. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009)
(providing description of litigants). The six defendants named in the complaint
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complaint sought to abate the "defendants' ongoing contribution
to a public nuisance," stemming from their "substantial contribut[ion] to elevated levels of carbon dioxide and global
warming."2 2
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants' contributions to
the atmospheric carbon level were quite significant. 23 The defendants' annual emissions comprised approximately one quarter of the
U.S. electric power sector's carbon dioxide emissions and about ten
percent of all carbon dioxide emissions from human activities nationwide.2 4 Furthermore, the plaintiffs' complaint cited reports
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences as evidence of the strong scientific
consensus that heightened GHG concentrations cause global
warming. 25
While the climate change threat may be global in scope, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleged climate change was imposing acutely
local, harmful effects on their states' environments, residents, and
property.2 6 According to the states, climate change was reducing
California's mountain snowpack, "the single largest freshwater
source, critical to sustaining water to the State's 34 million residents
during the half of each year when there is minimal precipitation."2 7
The states also alleged they were experiencing other harmful efincluded: American Electric Power Company, Inc.; American Electric Power Service Corporation; Southern Company; Tennessee Valley Authority; Xcel Energy;
and Cinergy Corporation. Id. Five of the defendants directly generated GHG
emissions as utility companies, whereas American Electric Power Service Corporation merely provided management and professional services on behalf of American Electric Power Company. Id. at 316 n.1.
22. Id. at 316 (describing allegations made in states' complaint).
23. See id. (noting plaintiffs' allegations as to magnitude of defendants' annual GHG emissions).
24. Id. (outlining plaintiffs' claims regarding defendants' contribution to atmospheric GHG levels and global warming). The plaintiffs claimed the defendants' GHG emission levels were particularly unacceptable given how the
companies have "practical, feasible and economically viable options for reducing
emissions." Id. at 317. Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs, the implementation of such GHG-reducing alternatives by the defendants would not require a
material rise in consumers' electricity costs. See id.
25. See id. at 316-17 (noting plaintiffs' evidence that elevated GHG emissions
cause global warming). The plaintiffs also stated that a proportional relationship
exists between GHG emissions and the harm posed by global warming: "The
greater the emissions, the greater and faster the temperature change will be, with
greater resulting injuries." Id. Conversely, the "lower the level of emissions, the
smaller and slower total temperature change will be, with lesser injuries." Id.
26. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 317 (noting harmful effects of climate change
that states alleged were both already occurring and likely to occur or accelerate in
future).
27. Id. (discussing details alleged in plaintiffs' complaint).
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fects of climate change, including warmer average temperatures;
later freezes and earlier spring thaws; and a decrease in average
snowfall and the duration of snow cover in New England and California.2 8 The plaintiffs predicted that if carbon emissions are not
reduced to a sustainable level, a catalogue of injuries would befall
upon them within ten to one hundred years. 2 9 The impact of these
injuries on property, ecology, and public health, according to the
plaintiffs, would cause them extensive economic harm.3 0
The plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York.3 1 Specifically, they requested that the court permanently enjoin each defendant to abate
the public nuisance of excessive emissions, first by capping their
emissions, and second by ordering an emissions reduction of a
specified percentage each year for at least ten years.3 2 The defendants, however, contended that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted because, inter alia: (1) there is
no recognized federal common law cause of action to reduce GHG
emissions; (2) separation of powers principles, specifically the political question doctrine, precluded the court from adjudicating these
actions; and (3) congressional legislation has displaced any federal
common law cause of action addressing global warming.3 3
The district court refused to allow the case to proceed to the
merits stage, dismissing it as a nonjusticiable political question.3 4
28. See id. (discussing states' allegations of harm they suffered from climate
change).
29. See id. at 318 (detailing future injuries state litigants claim they will incur if
global warming is not mitigated through reduction in GHG emissions). Specifically, the states claimed they would suffer the following future injuries:
[I]ncreased illnesses and deaths caused by intensified and prolonged
heat waves; increased smog, with a concomitant increase in residents' respiratory problems; significant beach erosion; accelerated sea level rise
and the subsequent inundation of coastal land and damage to coastal
infrastructure; salinization of marshes and water supplies; lowered Great
Lakes water levels, and impaired shipping, recreational use, and hydropower generation; more droughts and floods, resulting in property damage; increased wildfires, particularly in California; and the widespread
disruption of ecosystems, which would seriously harm hardwood forests
and reduce biodiversity.
Id.
30. Id. (describing economic injuries states allege they will incur upon manifestation of predicted future harms).
31. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 317 (noting venue where American Electric plaintiffs
filed suit).
32. Id. (explaining equitable relief sought by plaintiffs).
33. Id. at 319 (illustrating grounds defendants asserted during motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint before district court).
34. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (dismissing case as nonjusticiable under political question doctrine).
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The court reasoned that the political question doctrine applied because resolution of the plaintiffs' "transcendently legislative" lawsuit
required initial policy determinations that must first be made by the
elected branches.35 According to the district court, the required
initial policy determinations included the "identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests."3 6 Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that their lawsuit presented a "simple nuisance claim of
the kind courts have adjudicated in the past."3 7 Rather, the district
court agreed with the defendants that "none of the pollution-aspublic-nuisance cases cited by [p]laintiffs has touched on so many
areas of national and international policy."38 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint on political question grounds.3 9
III.

BACKGROUND

The political question doctrine is a justiciability doctrine articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court which operates essentially as a
function of the separation of powers principle. 40 When the political question doctrine applies, a court is prevented from adjudicating the case. 41 The genesis of the doctrine can be traced back to
the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison,42 where Chief Justice
35. See id. at 272 (commenting on what court perceived to be legislative nature of plaintiffs' lawsuit and requested relief).
36. Id. at 274 (observing initial policy decisions court would have to make if it
decided plaintiffs' case on its merits).
37. Id. at 272 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that their case was ordinary nuisance action).
38. Id. (distinguishing plaintiffs' lawsuit from previous environmental public
nuisance cases). The plaintiffs cited Missouri v. Illinois, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee as evidence that courts had previously handled
important and wide-reaching pollution cases under this tort doctrine. See id.
39. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009)
(summarizing Second Circuit's holding on political question issue). The court
also ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on a number of collateral issues, clearing the way
for a federal court to decide the plaintiffs' action on the merits on remand. See id.
Specifically, the court also held that all of the plaintiffs had standing to sue; the
federal common law of nuisance governed their claims; the plaintiffs had successfully stated claims under the federal common law of nuisance; and their claims
under federal common law were not displaced by Congressional or EPA action. Id.
40. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (noting relationship between
judiciary and coordinate branches of government provides rationale for political
question doctrine).
41. See Shawn M. LaTourette, Note, Global Climate Change: A PoliticalQuestion,
40 RUTGERs L.J. 219, 225 (2008) (summarizing political question doctrine and its
effect on court's ability to adjudicate case).
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (discussing nature of political
question).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss2/6

6

Schiraldi: Ring Temperatures, Political Questions, and Public Nuisances: The

2011]

RISING TEMPERATURES

327

Marshall remarked, "where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive,. . . act[ing] in cases in
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,. . .
their acts are only politically examinable." 43
Despite its historical pedigree, the doctrine is quite controversial and has been severely criticized by scholars who favor robust
judicial review.4 4 These scholars view a doctrine that excludes constitutional issues from the judiciary's reach with "strict and skeptical
scrutiny." 45 The political question doctrine contains two strands:
one is constitutionally-based, arising from the text and structure of
the document, 4 6 while the other is prudential and not constitutionally required. 4 7
The Supreme Court delivered its most comprehensive, and
often cited, articulation of the political question doctrine in Baker v.
Carr (Baker).48 The Court identified six factors in Baker, any one of
which, if deemed "inextricable from the case at bar," indicate the
presence of a political question:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adher43. Id. (explaining that issues or actions constitutionally committed to political branches are not judicially reviewable).
44. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 133
(3d ed. 2006) (relating how some critics of political question doctrine contend
"that it is inappropriate to leave constitutional questions to the political branches
of government" because "the judicial role is to enforce the Constitution").
45. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597,
600 (1976) (observing that because judicial review is now "firmly established as a
keystone of our constitutional jurisprudence," any doctrine that exempts cases
from judicial review should be viewed critically).
46. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fallof the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 247-48
(2002) (describing constitutionally-based strand of political question doctrine).
This strand states that the "Constitution carves out certain categories of issues that
will be resolved as a matter of total legislative or executive discretion." Id. at 247.
47. See id. at 253 (explaining how prudential strand of political question doctrine is not anchored in constitutional interpretation, but rather was created by
courts to protect their legitimacy and avoid conflict with political branches).
48. 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (discussing need and Court's intention to
clarify political question doctrine).
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ence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.4 9
These six elements are "probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty"50 and contain both the constitutionally
mandated and prudential strands of the political question
doctrine.5 1
The first Baker factor represents the "classical" or constitutionally anchored strand, while the last five factors comprise the prudential strand of the doctrine.52 The Baker test and its role in the
political question doctrine analysis can best be understood by examining the specific areas where the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have either invoked or refused to invoke the doctrine.5 3 Accordingly, the next section will briefly review how federal courts
have applied the Baker factors in the following two contexts where
the political question doctrine has most commonly been utilized:
domestic constitutional issues and disputes implicating foreign policy issues.
A.

Domestic Constitutional Issues

Certain recurring domestic political issues have frequently
raised political questions.5 4 The Supreme Court has consistently
held that controversies arising over the interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, which states that the U.S. guarantees those living in
55
each state a republican form of government, are nonjusticiable.
In Luther v. Borden,5 6 for example, the Court held that the text of
49. Id. at 217 (providing six-factor test for political question doctrine).
50. See Vieth v. jubelirer,541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (indicating order in which
Baker criteria should be considered).
51. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 265 (observing that Court in Baker recognized not only classical theory of political question doctrine, but prudential strand
as well).
52. See id. (identifying which Baker factors comprise constitutional and prudential strands of political question doctrine and noting uncertainty regarding second factor's classification).
53. See CHEMERINSKv, supra note 44, at 131 (explaining that to understand how
courts are likely to apply political question doctrine, it is necessary to review scenarios where political questions have been found).
54. For a discussion of the domestic issues that tend to raise political questions, see infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
55. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 134 (explaining how Court "consistently has held" that cases alleging Guarantee Clause violations are nonjusticiable).
56. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 35-36 (1849) (establishing Guarantee Clause precedent). This seminal Guarantee Clause case involved a trespass claim against a sheriff who claimed he acted under the lawful authority of the Rhode Island
government. See id. at 34-39. The trespass occurred during a period of political
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the Constitution's Guarantee Clause commits to Congress the determination of what government a state establishes.5 7 The Supreme
Court has also held that certain congressional decisions concerning
the Legislative Branch's processes and members are not judicially
reviewable because their interpretation is constitutionally committed to that branch.5 8 This deferential approach was demonstrated
in Field v. Clark,5 9 where the Court dismissed as nonjusticiable a
claim that a tariff law was invalid because a section of the statute
passed by Congress was omitted from the final version signed by the
President.6 0
Federal courts have often found issues concerning the ratification of constitutional amendments to present nonjusticiable political questions. 6 1 For example, the Supreme Court held in Coleman

turmoil in the state, where two factions claimed to constitute its rightful government. See id. at 34. The Supreme Court refused to decide on its merits the issue of
which faction constituted the legal government of Rhode Island at the time of the
trespass. See id.
57. See id. at 42 (explaining that issue of which group was rightful government
of Rhode Island was constitutionally committed to Congress). The Court explained that the Guarantee Clause commits this decision to Congress because, in
order for "the United States to guarantee each State a republican government,
Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State
before it can determine whether it is republican or not." Id.
58. See CHEMERINSKY, supia note 44, at 143 (noting that Court often finds congressional self-governance nonjusticiable).
59. 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892) (finding tariff law's validity nonjusticiable).
60. See id. at 673-75 (explaining why process by which House and Senate pass
and certify bills is not justiciable). The Supreme Court, basing its decision largely
on what would later become the first Baker factor, held that the Constitution committed the issue to the political branches. See id. at 670-71. The Court has been
unwilling to cede to Congress all constitutional oversight of its decisions pertaining
to processes and members, however, particularly when congressional action exceeds the scope of a textual commitment. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 494-505 (1969) (deciding case based on House's passage of resolution to prevent member elected to Ninetieth Congress from taking his seat). In Powell, the
plaintiff alleged that the House's resolution, excluding him from taking his seat as
Congressman, violated the Constitution. Id. He argued that Article I, Section Five
of the Constitution allows those in Congress, when acting as "the Judge of the
Qualifications of its own Members," to base their judgment on only the qualifications explicitly stated in the text. See id. at 521-24. The Court agreed and held that
no political question was present because Congress's decision to exclude the plaintiff was based on factors beyond those explicitly required in the text. See id. at 548.
The Court explained that Article I, Section Five is "at most a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in
the Constitution." Id. Therefore, the political question doctrine did not bar the
Court from adjudicating the plaintiffs claim. Id.
61. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 145-46 (observing that, while Supreme
Court has invoked political question doctrine in disputes over ratification procedures, it has done so inconsistently).
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v. Miller6 2 that the Constitution consigned to Congress the exclusive
authority to determine the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in light of previous rejection or withdrawal.6 3 The Court has
also suggested that particular aspects of the impeachment process
textually committed to Congress are not judicially reviewable. 64 In
Nixon v. United States,65 the Court held that the Constitution's assertion "[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all impeachments," made the Senate responsible for interpreting the meaning
of the word "try."66 Finally, a plurality of the Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer67 recently held that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because "no judicially discernible and manageable
standards.

B.

.

. have emerged" for adjudicating them.68

Foreign Policy

The political question doctrine is raised more often in the foreign affairs context than in any other area. 69 Cases that directly
implicate foreign affairs issues are sometimes deemed nonjusticiable because their resolution "frequently turn [s] on standards that
defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion de62. 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) (finding Constitution committed power to Congress to determine effectiveness of state legislature's ratification of constitutional
amendments).
63. See id. at 446-51 (noting that historical precedent of Fourteenth Amendment's passage-where Congress decided certain states had ratified amendment despite previous rejection or attempted withdrawal-supports Court's finding that this
matter was political question). The Court also determined that only Congress had
the authority to decide the duration of the "reasonable time" by which an amendment must be ratified because no standard or criteria existed with which a court
could reach an appropriate decision. See id. at 453-55.
64. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 148-49 (discussing how Court first recognized impeachment as implicating political question doctrine).
65. 506 U.S. 224, 225 (1993) (finding plaintiffs claim that Senate impeachment procedures violated Impeachment Trial Clause nonjusticiable).
66. See id. (observing that Impeachment Trial Clause met Bakers textual commitment factor because Clause's language and structure reflect "a grant of authority to the Senate, and the word 'sole' indicates that the authority is reposed in the
Senate and nowhere else"). Additionally, the court observed that judicial review of
congressional impeachment proceedings would "be inconsistent with the Framers'
insistence that our system be one of checks and balances . . . [because] impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature."
Id. at 235.
67. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
68. See id. at 279 (finding that political gerrymandering claims present political question).
69. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 935 (observing that foreign relations issues constitutionally committed to elected branches are subject to political question doctrine).
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monstratively committed to the Executive or Legislature."70 While
some foreign affairs cases may inextricably implicate these first two
Baker factors, the Court cautioned in Baker that "it is an error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."7 1
Because the Constitution commits responsibility for setting the
nation's foreign policy to the political branches, as a general matter, cases are only deemed nonjusticiable if their adjudication
would require a court to: (1) make direct foreign policy decisions;
(2) directly challenge the merits or wisdom of a foreign policy decision already made; or (3) impermissibly interfere with the political
branches' conduct of foreign affairs. 72 Conversely, the lawsuit is
likely to be justiciable when a case has a more indirect or attenuated connection to U.S. foreign policy and states a cause of action
in tort or another substantive doctrine that courts have experience
applying.7 3
When deciding a case on its merits requires a significant foreign policy decision, courts will find a political question.7 4 The Supreme Court has held, for example, that the political branches of
the government have the power to determine when a war has commenced and ended.7 5 The issue of "who is the sovereign of a territory" was found by the Court to be reserved to the political

70. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (clarifying why some foreign
relations issues implicate political question doctrine).
71. See id. (explaining how "sweeping statements" that all cases touching foreign affairs are political questions are incorrect and that justiciability determination requires "a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed"). The
Court also stated that an analysis of the justiciability of a foreign affairs case should
include consideration of the litigated issue's history of management by the political branches, "its susceptibility to judicial handling in light of the nature and posture of the specific case," and the potential consequences of deciding the case. Id.
72. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 231-35 (providing overview of scenarios
where cases touching foreign affairs are most likely to be deemed nonjusticiable).
While these nonjusticiable cases almost invariably implicate the first prong of the
Baker test (constitutional commitment of issue to coequal branch), courts often
also find the presence of the second prong (lack ofjudicial standard or legal rule
to apply). See id.
73. See id. at 230 (explaining that litigation centering on tort or property
claims attenuated from foreign affairs issue is less likely to raise political question).
74. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 140-41 (noting various factual scenarios
where adjudication would require foreign policy decision and courts have thus
invoked political question doctrine).
75. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 19 (1827) (holding that authority to determine commencement of hostilities is vested in political branches and therefore
nonjusticiable).
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branches whose determination "conclusively binds the courts."7 6
The Supreme Court also held that, because Article II of the Constitution gives the Executive Branch the power to send and receive
ambassadors, courts should defer to the Secretary of State regarding a person's diplomatic status.77 Finally, federal courts will follow
the political branches' judgment of whether a treaty is still in
force.7 8
Additionally, courts invoke the political question doctrine
when a litigant directly challenges the wisdom or legality of a congressional or presidential foreign policy decision.7 9 In Dickson v.
Ford,8 0 a taxpayer brought an Establishment Clause challenge
against a congressional enactment authorizing emergency military
aid to Israel.8 1 The Fifth Circuit found the claim posed a nonjusticiable political question by directly challenging the President and
Congress's policy decision to "maintain Israel's self-defense capacity." 8 2 The court explained that judicial review of the aid policy
would implicate the first (constitutional commitment of issue to coequal branch), second (lack of applicable judicial standard), and
fifth (need for government to speak with single voice) Baker
factors.8 3
76. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326-28 (1939) (finding that President's recognition of foreign governments was not reviewable because "conduct of
foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political departments").
77. In Re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 430 (1890) (observing that courts must accept
certification of State Department as dispositive on issue of diplomatic status because such determinations are left to Executive Branch discretion).
78. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) (explaining how treaty
status is political question and power to determine these matters was not confided
in judiciary); see also N.Y. Chinese TVPrograms, Inc. v. UE. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F.2d
847, 852 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that treaty between U.S. and Taiwan remained in
effect, despite former no longer recognizing latter, because American political
branches clearly wanted to preserve treaty).
79. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding direct challenge to President's foreign policy decision nonjusticiable). In DaCosta,
the Second Circuit invoked the political question doctrine in response to the plaintiff's claim that President Nixon's temporary escalation of the Vietnam War was
illegal. See id. at 1147. Besides noting "the Constitution's specific textual commitment of decision-making responsibility ... in a theatre of war to the President," the
court also emphasized that it lacked discoverable and manageable standards for
deciding "whether a specific military operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the
war." Id. at 1154-55.
80. 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
81. See id. at 235 (describing plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge to congressional act giving emergency military aid to Israel).
82. See id. at 236 (observing that plaintiffs' claim directly challenged foreign
policy decision of political branches).
83. See id. (explaining how political question doctrine barred lawsuit because
adjudicating it would implicate first, second, and fifth Baker factors).
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The political question doctrine is unlikely to be implicated
when a case touches on foreign policy in a more attenuated manner; involves the violation of an individual right; and requires the
application of a legal standard or rule that the judiciary has an extensive history of utilizing. 84 In Klinghoffer v. S.NC. Achille Lauro
(Klinghoffer), 85 the Second Circuit refused to invoke the doctrine to
dismiss the plaintiffs' tort claims against the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) for its seizure of an Italian cruise ship and the
killing of one of the ship's passengers.86 While the plaintiffs' claims
touched on foreign policy issues and arose in a politically charged
context, the court explained that this "does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political question."8 7 The court observed that the crucial first Baker factor did
not apply because deciding ordinary tort suits has been constitutionally committed to "none other than. . . the Judiciary."88
In Kadic v. Karadi6 (Kadic),89 the Second Circuit again refused
to find a political question when presented with a claim for human
rights violations against the commander of the Bosnian-Serb military forces during the Bosnian Civil War.9 0 The court explained
84. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
no political question where property claims touched on international relations issues). In Alperin, the Ninth Circuit held that conversion and unjust enrichment
claims filed by Holocaust survivors against the Vatican Bank, regarding treasure it
allegedly obtained from a Nazi puppet regime during World War II, were not political questions. See id. at 539-44. The court explained that, because "the Property
Claims simply seek restitution for looted assets" and do not encroach on the foreign policy prerogatives of the political branches, "[d]eciding this sort of controversy is exactly what courts do." Id. at 551. Additionally, the court observed that
property law provided "concrete legal bases for courts to reach a reasoned decision." See id. at 554-55. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the presence of clear
standards for adjudication obviated the need for it to make an initial policy decision (the third Baker factor). Id.
85. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. See id. at 46-47 (summarizing plaintiffs claims arising from PLO's hijacking of cruise ship, during which American passenger was killed).
87. Id. at 49 (emphasizing that international and politically charged context
of case is insufficient for demonstrating nonjusticiability).
88. Id. (stating resolution of torts cases is constitutionally committed tojudiciary and "[t]his factor alone . . . strongly suggests that the political question doctrine does not apply"). The court also observed that the district court would not
be required to render a decision without "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" because the common law of torts provides clear and well-settled rules.
Id.
89. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
90. See id. at 236-37 (finding claims brought by Croat and Muslim citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovina under Alien Tort Claims Act justiciable and not barred by political question doctrine). The claims at issue alleged human rights violations
stemming from orders by the President of the self-proclaimed, break-away BosniaSerb republic of Srpska. Id.
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that "universally recognized norms of international law provide judicially discoverable and manageable standards."9 1 The Second
Circuit also found that the existence of judicial standards for deciding the case "obviates any need to make initial policy decisions" and
"undermines the claim that such suits relate to matters that are constitutionally committed to another branch."9 2
C.

The Political Question Doctrine and Environmental Public
Nuisance Actions

Outside the context of climate change litigation, federal courts
have not invoked the political question doctrine in public nuisancebased pollution cases, even when the ruling was likely to have substantial interstate environmental and economic effects.93 In Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri),94 the Supreme Court heard a public
nuisance action brought by Missouri that sought to restrain Chicago from discharging its sewage into a tributary of the Mississippi
River.95 The Court did not deem this case nonjusticiable despite
the "international importance" of the alleged nuisance.9 6 One year
later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper),9 Georgia
filed a suit against a Tennessee company whose noxious gas emissions were destroying its forests, orchards, and crops.9 8 Despite the
significant environmental and economic interests implicated in the

case, the Court did not find a political question and instead granted
91. Id. at 249 (explaining how second Baker factor-absence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards-is inapplicable because universally recognized norms of international law are available for adjudicating plaintiffs' claims).
92. Id. (stating that presence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating case rendered third Baker factor-whether deciding case
requires initial policy decision-inapplicable). The court also asserted that the
existence of judicially manageable standards significantly undermines any argument that the first Bakerfactor-textual constitutional commitment of issue to coequal political branch-is present. Id.
93. See Thorpe, supra note 6, at 101 (observing that courts have decided many
toxic tort and nuisance-based pollution cases).

94. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
95. Id. at 517 (describing case's factual background). Missouri also alleged
that if Chicago's proposed discharge were to occur, "1,500 tons of poisonous filth"
would be sent daily into the Mississippi River. Id. According to Missouri, this sewage would so pollute the river water that it would be "unfit for drinking, agriculture, or manufacturing purposes." Id.
96. Id. at 518 (describing claim's potential international significance). Writing for the Court,Justice Holmes remarked that Missouri's claim would be of international importance if proven because it regarded "a visible change of a great river
from a pure stream into a polluted and poisoned ditch." Id.
97. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
98. See id. at 236 (explaining factual basis of injunction Georgia sought
against Tennessee copper companies).
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Georgia's proposed injunction. 9 Sixty-five years later, the Supreme
Court allowed another complicated pollution-based public nuisance claim to proceed on the merits in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(Milwaukee).' 00 There, Illinois sought an injunction to prevent the
city of Milwaukee from continuing its practice of dumping "some
200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage" into
Lake Michigan. 0 1
Prior to the Second Circuit's ruling in American Electric, district
courts decided and dismissed three climate change-public nuisance
cases (including the lower court's decision in American Electric) on
political question grounds.1 0 2 In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,' 0 3 Gulf
Coast property owners brought public nuisance, trespass, and civil
conspiracy claims against oil, coal, and chemical companies for
their GHG emissions.1 04 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi held the case was nonjusticiable because it
raised a political question. 0 5 Likewise, in California v. General Motors Corp., 0 6 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California invoked the doctrine to dismiss an action by California
against various automakers for contributing to the public nuisance
of global warming.10 7 The court relied heavily on the district
court's reasoning from American Electric and, accordingly, held that
the third Baker factor (need for initial policy decision) rendered the
lawsuit nonjusticiable. 0 The court reasoned that deciding the
99. See id. at 239 (granting Georgia's injunction).
100. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
101. Id. at 93 (describing Illinois's allegation and desired injunctive relief).
Illinois brought its complaint under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and
the Court exercised its discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district
court. Id. at 108. Before doing so, however, the Court for the first time recognized
the tort of public nuisance as part of the federal common law. Id.
102. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding climate change nuisance action to raise nonjusticiable
political question); Calfomia v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJ, 2007 WL
2726871, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding global warming tort claim
nonjusticiable because it impermissibly implicates policy issues consigned solely to
political branches); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007
WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (holding plaintiffs claims non-justiciable under political question doctrine).
103. No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
104. See id. at *1 (describing plaintiffs' claims).
105. See id. (granting defendants' motion to dismiss).
106. No. C06-05755 MJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
107. Id. at *1 (providing factual background of California's claim).
108. See id. at *6 (stating that third Baker factor "largely controls the analysis in
the current case due to the complexity of the initial global warming policy determinations that must be made by the elected branches prior to the proper adjudication of the Plaintiffs federal common law nuisance claim").
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case would require the judge to balance competing environmental,
economic, foreign relations, and national security interests, which
the elected branches must speak on first. 0 9

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In American Electric, the Second Circuit provided a detailed
analysis of the political question doctrine, the issue upon which the
lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim." 0 The court first provided a brief background of the doctrine along with the constellations of facts that prompted its application."' The court then
analyzed the plaintiffs' complaint under each Baker factor and ultimately determined that none were applicable.1 12 This finding
prompted the Second Circuit to conclude that the district court erroneously applied the political question doctrine to bar the plaintiffs' claim.1 13

A.

Second Circuit's Overview of the Political Question Doctrine

After noting that the political question doctrine is "primarily a
function of the separation of powers," the court briefly discussed
the doctrine's historical origins." 4 The Second Circuit then identified the Supreme Court's Baker decision as providing the modern
framework for resolving political question issues." 5 After laying
out the six Baker factors, the Second Circuit cautioned that "Baker
set a high bar for nonjusticiability" by requiring at least one of the
factors to be "inextricable" from the case."6 In support of this inference, the Second Circuit observed that "the Supreme Court has
109. See id. at *7 (discussing interests that court would need to balance in
adjudicating case). The court concluded that it was impossible and improper for it
to determine the relative weight to assign each of those interests without an initial
policy decision by the elected branches. Id.
110. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 321-32 (2d Cir.
2009) (discussing political question issue).
111. See id. at 321-23 (providing overview of political question doctrine).
112. See id. at 324-32 (applying Baker factors to facts of case and deeming all
inapplicable).
113. See id. at 332 (holding that political question doctrine did not bar case
from reaching merits stage).
114. See id. at 321 (discussing political question doctrine's primary purpose as
preserving separation of powers, along with doctrine's historical roots).
115. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 321 (observing how Baker Court attempted to
identify and describe attributes of doctrine).
116. See id. (quoting six Baker factors and noting how Baker indicated that
these factors should be difficult to invoke).
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only rarely found that a political question bars its adjudication of an
issue."'

17

The court next stated that the defendants' arguments
"touch [ed] upon" the two most frequently litigated areas of the political question doctrine: "domestic controversies implicating constitutional issues and the conduct of foreign policy."" 8 When
resolving political question issues surrounding domestic controversies, the Second Circuit explained, courts usually analyze the language of the Constitution to look for a textual commitment to
another governmental branch.1 19 The court noted, however, that
"not all cases touching [domestic] constitutional issues" raise political questions, even where they also raise issues of great importance
to the political branches and have motivated partisan debate. 12 0 In
cases implicating foreign policy issues, the court stated that a political question is sometimes found where adjudication would require
the review of legislative and executive policy choices and value determinations. 12 ' The Second Circuit concluded its overview of the
political question doctrine by quoting Baker's cautionary statement
that "it is an error to suppose that every case or controversy that
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 2 2
B. Application of the First Baker Factor: Is There a Textually
Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment of the Issue
to a Coordinate Political Department?
The court began its analysis by observing that the first Baker
factor was "the dominant consideration in any political question inquiry." 2 3 It then proceeded to waive the defendants' argument
that the issue of climate change regulation was textually committed
117. See id. at 321-22 (commenting on how Supreme Court has invoked political question doctrine only twice in last forty-plus years).
118. See id. at 322 (expressing that defendants' political question arguments
touched upon domestic controversies, which implicate constitutional issues and
foreign affairs).
119. Id. (describing how courts determine whether political question doctrine
should be invoked in domestic constitutional controversies).
120. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 322 (observing that not every issue implicating
Constitution and motivating partisan debate raises political question).
121. See id. (describing cases where doctrine was invoked because courts
would have had to review foreign policy decision of political branches).
122. Id. at 323 (quoting Baker's cautionary statement regarding breadth of
doctrine in foreign affairs context).
123. Id. at 324 (quoting Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1991))
(relating that first Baker factor is most important of all six factors).
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to Congress by way of the Commerce Clause.' 2 4 The court next
addressed the defendants' contention that allowing the plaintiffs to
use a federal nuisance action to reduce domestic GHG emissions
"will impermissibly interfere with the President's authority to manage foreign relations."' 2 5 The Second Circuit replied that the defendants' arguments vastly overstated the scope of the plaintiffs'
claim and all but ignored the "discrete domestic nuisance issues actually presented." 2 6 The plaintiffs' complaint, according to the
court, did not "ask the court to fashion a comprehensive and farreaching solution to global climate change." 12 7 Furthermore, the
court maintained that the defendants' foreign affairs interference
argument was misguided because a victory by the plaintiffs on the
merits "[would] not establish a national or international emissions
28
policy."1
The relationship between the foreign policy concerns raised by
the defendants and the relief requested by the plaintiffs, the court
concluded, was too "tangential and attenuated" to invoke the political question doctrine. 129 In concluding its analysis of the first Baker
factor, the court quoted Klinghoffer's assertion that "[t]he depart-

ment to whom [the] issue has been 'constitutionally committed' is
124. See id. (finding defendants' Commerce Clause textual commitment argument waived). Because the defendants' briefs failed to explain how the issue was
textually committed to Congress by the Commerce Clause, the court found that
this assertion had been insufficiently argued. Id. Pursuant to an earlier Second
Circuit case, "[i]ssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived
and normally will not be addressed on appeal." Id. (quoting Norton v. Sam's Club,
145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d. Cir. 1998)).
125. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 322 (describing defendants' argument that
plaintiffs' claim implicated first Baker factor by impermissibly interfering with President's foreign affairs powers). The defendants claimed adjudication would produce this interference because three Presidents, with the approval of Congress,
have employed a multilateral strategy for addressing global warming. Id. As part
of this strategy, the U.S. refuses to commit to unilateral, mandatory emissions reductions. See id. The defendants argued that because the plaintiffs' claims demanded "unilateral reductions in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions," they threatened
to undermine this international strategy by leaving the President with less American emissions cuts to offer in exchange for reductions by other nations. Id.
126. Id. at 325 (rejecting defendants' characterization of lawsuit as magnifying and distorting real issues at stake).
127. Id. (articulating appropriate scope of plaintiffs' claims). The court observed that fashioning a comprehensive solution to climate change is a task that
"arguably falls within the purview of the political branches." Id
128. See id. (stating that plaintiff victory would not establish national or international GHG emissions policy). Such a ruling, the court continued, would also
not require mandatory, unilateral emissions reductions for entities not party to the
lawsuit. Id.
129. Id. (explaining why defendants' foreign policy concerns are insufficient
to invoke political question doctrine).
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none other than our own-the Judiciary."13 0 Accordingly, the
court found no textual commitment in the Constitution conferring
to the political branches exclusive authority over disputes arising
from GHG emissions or other forms of alleged nuisance.1 3 1
C.

Application of the Second Baker Factor: Is There a Lack of
Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards for
Resolving the Case?

The court began its analysis of the second Baker factor by outlining the defendants' arguments.' 3 2 The utility companies maintained that, given the uncertainty surrounding the precise effect of
GHGs on the climate and the myriad of public policy questions a
court would confront while adjudicating the plaintiffs' claim,
"vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts" derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts were a woefully inadequate standard
for decision.' 3 3 The Second Circuit found this argument unpersuasive for several reasons.13 4 First, the court noted that "federal
courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public
nuisance cases for over a century."1 35 The court cited the Supreme
Court decisions in Missouri, Tennessee Copper, and Milwaukee as supporting the proposition that courts have long "employed familiar
public nuisance precepts, grappled with complex scientific evidence, and resolved the issues presented." 3 6
130. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 325 (quoting Klinghoffer's assertion that issue is constitutionally committed to Judiciary).
131. See id. (concluding that disputes arising from GHG emissions are not
textually committed by Constitution to political branches).
132. See id. at 326 (setting up analysis of second Baker factor by describing
defendants' arguments).
133. See id. (providing defendants' primary argument for why second Baker
factor-lack of judicially manageable standards-applies). According to the defendants, some policy questions a court deciding the plaintiffs' claims would have
to answer included: "How fast should emissions be reduced?; Should power plants
or automobiles be required to reduce emissions?; Who should bear the cost of
reduction?; and How are the impacts on jobs, the economy, and the nation's security to be balanced against the risks of future harms?" Id.
134. See id. at 329 (expressing disagreement with the defendants that there
are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving this case).
135. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 326 (observing that courts have extensive experience adjudicating complex public nuisance cases).
136. Id. at 326-27 (providing facts and holdings from cases that Second Circuit deemed evidence of "a long line of federal common law of nuisance cases").
The court's discussion of Missouri v. Illinois and Georgiav. Tenn. Copper Co. focused
on the complex scientific and expert evidence the Supreme Court was required to
analyze. Id. The Second Circuit's analysis of these two cases also emphasized how
the Supreme Court had to balance the plaintiffs' need for a clean environment
with the economic harm of too stringent pollution restrictions. Id.
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Next, the Second Circuit determined that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts' definition of public nuisance ("an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public")' 3 7 provided a workable standard from which a district court could resolve
this case.' 3 8 Furthermore, the court cited Klinghoffer as demonstrative of the federal courts' willingness and capacity to apply well-settled tort rules to a variety of new and complex problems.'" 9 After
quoting Klinghoffer's reasoning that the applicability of tort law's
"clear and well settled rules" to the dispute meant judicially discoverable standards were present, the Second Circuit held that the defendants were not entitled to dismissal based on the second Baker
factor.140
D.

Application of the Third Baker Factor: Is It Impossible to
Decide this Case Without an Initial Policy
Determination of a Kind Clearly for Nonjudicial
Discretion?

After acknowledging that the district court relied on the third
Baker factor for its nonjusticiability holding, the Second Circuit attacked the lower court's reasoning and conclusion.' 4 ' Specifically,
the Second Circuit rejected the district court's assertions that: (1)
the plaintiffs' nuisance claims cannot be adjudicated until Congress
has supplied an initial policy decision on climate change and (2)
any judicial actions having the effect of regulating GHG emissions
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1979) (defining public
nuisance).
138. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 328 (stating that Restatement's definition "provides
a workable standard"). The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Restatement's
public nuisance definition was broad. Id. Nevertheless, the court believed the definition could be applied by the district court in a principled manner to resolve the
dispute at hand. Id. In support of this conclusion, the court cited United States v.
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973). Id. There, a district court
applied the Restatement's public nuisance standard in a lawsuit brought by the
U.S. to reduce pollution in Lake Champlain against an entity that owned and
leased vessels used to transport oil across the lake. Id. at 120-21.
139. See id. at 328-29 (describing facts and holding of Second Circuit's decision in Klinghoffer while emphasizing court's rejection of PLO's argument that
wrongful death claim was nonjusticiable because it arose in politically volatile context of international terrorism).
140. Id. at 329-30 (agreeing with Klinghoffe/s statement that "because the
common law of tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court
can easily rely, this case does require the court to render a decision in the absence
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards").
141. See id. at 330 (observing that district court relied on third Baker factorimpossibility of deciding case without initial policy determination-in dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint as political question).
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would be "counter[ ] [to] the political branches' refusal to act."14 2
According to the Second Circuit, legislative inaction toward GHG
emissions "falls far short" of what is needed to demonstrate a congressional intent to supplant the common law. 143 The court explained that the plaintiffs need not "wait for the political branches
to craft a 'comprehensive' global solution to global warming."144
In rejecting the district court's assertion that a court-ordered
reduction in the defendants' GHG emissions would be contrary to
Congress's will, the Second Circuit contended that "the political
branches are at the very least concerned about global warming."145
Finally, the court observed that, because the plaintiffs' action is "an
ordinary tort suit" governed by "recognized judicial standards
under the federal common law of nuisance," this "obviates any
need to make initial. policy decisions of the kind normally reserved
for nonjudicial discretion."' 4 6 Accordingly, the third Baker factor
did not apply.147

142. Id. (summarizing district court's reasoning for finding third Baker factor
to bar adjudication).
143. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 330 (explaining how district court's emphasis on
Congress's purported refusal to act was erroneous and "result[ed] in a decision
resting on a particularly unstable ground"). To support this assertion, the court
cited Illinois v. City of Milwaukee as standing for the proposition that "if the extant
statutes governing water pollution do not cover a plaintiffs claims and provide a
remedy, a plaintiff is free to bring its claim in under the federal common law of
nuisance" and need not "await the fashioning of a comprehensive approach to
domestic water pollution." Id.
144. Id. at 331 (expressing thatjust because CAA and other pollution statutes
currently "do not provide Plaintiffs with the remedy they seek does not mean that
Plaintiffs cannot bring an action and must wait for the political branches to craft a
'comprehensive' global solution to global warming").
145. Id. (rejecting district court's assertion that Congress's failure to regulate
GHGs reflected policy determination that global warming should not be addressed
through American GHG reductions). The Second Circuit also stated that the Executive Branch and Congress have given no indication they wish U.S. carbon emissions to increase. Id. As evidence of the political branches' concern about climate
change and GHGs, the court observed that "Congress has passed laws that call for
the study of climate change and research into technologies that will reduce emissions." Id.
146. See id. at 329, 331 (expressing how existence of well-recognized judicial
standard provided by common law of public nuisance eliminated need for initial
policy decision).
147. See id. at 331 (holding third Baker factor inapplicable).
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Application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Baker Factors: Will
Adjudication of This Case Demonstrate "Lack of Respect" for
the Political Branches; Contravene "An Unusual Need for
Unquestioning Adherence to a Political Decision Already
Made;" or "Embarrass" the Nation as a Result of "Multifarious
Pronouncements by Various Departments"?

The Second Circuit began by quoting from its opinion in Kadic
that the fourth through sixth Baker factors are only applicable when
adjudication "would contradict prior decisions taken by a political
branch in those limited contexts where such contradiction would
seriously interfere with important governmental interests."1 48 The
court noted that, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs' claims
met that standard because they contradicted "'U.S. policy [which]
is manifestly not to engage in unilateral reductions of domestic
emissions.' "149 The Second Circuit, however, was not persuaded
that there was, in fact, a unified U.S. policy on GHG emissions.1 50
Citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank (Alperin) 1'5 and Klinghoffer, the Second Circuit then stated that when there is no unified national policy on a foreign affairs issue, adjudication does not implicate the
fourth through sixth Baker factors. 15 2 Finally, the court observed
that the prerogatives of the political branches did not need to be
protected by the political question doctrine in this case because
Congress or the Executive Branch were free to displace any common law standards the decision set by choosing to regulate
emissions. 153
148. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 331 (quoting Kadic v. Karadfits explanation of
when Baker factors four through six are relevant).
149. See id. (conveying defendants' assertion that plaintiffs' lawsuit directly implicated fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors because suit contradicted deliberate
policy set by political branches).
150. Id. at 331-32 (rejecting premise of defendants' argument by asserting no
clear U.S. policy toward GHG emissions exists). The court observed that the "variegated" assertions made in the defendants' own briefs as to what constituted American GHG emissions policy "underscore[d] that there really is no unified policy."
Id. At various points in their briefs, the defendants asserted: (1) this country's
official policy is to reduce its generation of carbon emissions; (2) the political
branches have pursued a policy of research into climate change "as a prelude to
forming a coordinated, national policy[;]" and (3) in the international arena, U.S.
policy is to not engage in a unilateral reduction of domestic greenhouse gas emissions. See id.
151. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
152. See id. at 332 (stating that fourth through sixth Baker factors are not applicable where no national policy exists).
153. Id. (making separation of powers argument against applying political
question doctrine on grounds that political branches may displace any common
law standards by enacting statutory or regulatory standards).
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Second Circuit's decision and reasoning on the political
question issue in American Electric were, in large part, justified. 15 4 By
carefully applying the political question doctrine's legal principles
to the novel issue of climate change litigation, the Second Circuit
provided the plaintiffs with a path to relief on the merits without
straying from the doctrine's precedential past. 155 The Second Circuit's opinion in American Electric, unlike the district court's decision, was true to the substance and spirit of Bakers six-factor
political question test.15 6 The opinion was also based on a proper
understanding of the political question doctrine precedents from
federal court decisions.15 7
A.

The Second Circuit's Opinion was Consistent with the
Principles Articulated in Political Question Precedents

The Second Circuit's American Electric decision demonstrated
an understanding of the major principles underlying federal
courts' political question precedents. 15 8 The first of these principles reflected in the court's opinion is that the doctrine "is one of
'political questions,' not one of 'political cases."' 1 5 9 As a result,
courts cannot reject a bona fide controversy merely because it is

154. SeeJames R. May, New and Emerging ConstitutionalTheories and the Future of
Environmental Protection,40 ENvTL. L. REP. NEws & ANALYSis 10989, 10991 (2010)
(observing that some federal courts "have incorrectly invoked the political question doctrine" when declining to adjudicate climate change-based public nuisance
actions, while implying that Second Circuit's outcome in American Electric was
correct).
155. See Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine's Role in Climate Change
Nuisance Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties?, 40 ENvrL. L. REP.
NEWS AND ANALYsis 11229, 11230 (2010) (arguing American Electric court was correct in not applying political question doctrine to climate change lawsuit because
plaintiffs did not "directly challeng[e] decisions by the [political] branches related
to the military or foreign affairs").
156. See id. at 11233 (noting that Second Circuit's political question analysis
in American Electric conforms with historic approach to Baker test).
157. See May, supra note 154, at 10993 (asserting that American Electricwas correctly decided because political question doctrine "should not serve as a bar to
climate cases due to a lack of both a demonstrable constitutional commitment to
an elected branch and countervailing prudential concerns").
158. For a discussion of how American Electric was consistent with the legal
principles underpinning federal courts' political question precedents, see infra
notes 159 and accompanying text.
159. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting distinction between
"political cases" and issues raising nonjusticiable "political questions").
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"denominated 'political."' 1 6 0 Rather, the term "political" appearing in the doctrine's name refers to the Constitution's entrustment
of the litigated issue to the Legislative, or Executive Branch, the "political" branches.161 Its meaning does not "broadly relate to government, government policy, partisan or party politics, or the political
system." 162
Climate change has certainly become a partisan and divisive
issue in American politics, with Republicans substantially less likely
than Democrats to believe in the science behind it.163 Just because
climate change has become a partisan issue does not convert it into
a nonjusticiable political question, however.16 4 The district court
erred by implicitly making this assumption.1 6 5 The Second Circuit
correctly distinguished a political case from a political question by
holding that "the judiciary. . . can [not] decline to decide matters
within its jurisdiction simply because such matters may have political ramifications."1 66
The Second Circuit's decision also correctly focused on the
plaintiffs' specific claim instead of the broader political and foreign
affairs context in which the claim arose.167 Using this analytical
framework was the proper approach because copious precedent es160. See id. (explaining how presence of term "political" in political question
doctrine does not render nonjusticiable cases "semantic[ally] catalogued" as
"political").
161. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 869-70 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing meaning of political in political question doctrine).
162. Id. (distinguishing colloquial meaning of political with its meaning in
political question doctrine context).
163. SeeJames R. May, Climate Change, ConstitutionalConsignment, and the Political Question Doctrine, 85 DENv. U. L. REv. 919, 952 (2008) (describing how most
people would agree that "issues of climate change are controversial, complex, and
invite action by the elected branches"); see also Lexington, A Refreshing Dose of Honesty: Maria Cantwell and the Politicsof Global Warming,EcONoMisT, Feb. 6, 2010, at 69,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15453166 (reporting that disbelief
in climate change is norm among Republicans, with only 35% believing solid evidence of warming exists according to Pew poll).
164. See May, supra note 163, at 952 (observing that it is largely irrelevant
whether issue is complex or political when determining if political question doctrine applies).
165. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270-73
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (appearing to base determination that initial policy decision regarding climate change must be made by elected branches on politicized nature of
issue).
166. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009)
(rejecting district court's reasoning and explaining proper application of political
question doctrine).
167. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 248 (describing how precedents overwhelmingly indicate that specific claim, and not broader context of claim, controls
political question analysis).
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tablishes that "the political question doctrine bars judicial review
only when the precise matter to be decided has been constitutionally committed" to one of the political branches. 168 The district
court, therefore, was incorrect in virtually ignoring the plaintiffs'
precise public nuisance claim. That court mistakenly focused on
the purported "legislative nature of [the] litigation," and the potential "economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests" it "touched on."1 69 The Second Circuit, in contrast, performed the proper political question analysis by concentrating on
the "discrete domestic nuisance" claim presented, and by refusing
to characterize the lawsuit as implicating "complex, inter-related
and far-reaching policy questions."17 0
B.

The Court Properly Applied the Baker Factors to the
Nuisance-based Climate Change Action

The manner in which the Second Circuit applied each of the
Baker factors to the plaintiffs' claim was consistent with precedent
and reflected a nuanced understanding of the political question
doctrine.1 7 ' As discussed in the subsection above, when the court
applied the first Baker factor (textual commitment of issue to a political branch), it correctly focused on the plaintiffs' specific claim
and not the peripheral issues the lawsuit touched upon.' 7 2 In the
context of the first Baker prong analysis, the Second Circuit addressed whether the issue of climate change-causing emissions was
constitutionally committed to the political branches as part of their
foreign affairs power.' 7 3 In determining that it was not, the court
168. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Zivotosky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Edwards, J.,
concurring)) (explaining how political question inquiry should focus on specific
claim).
169. See Am. Elec., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272-74 (characterizing plaintiffs' claim by
focusing on its context and background); see also LaTourette, supra note 41, at 24950 (arguing that dismissals of climate change cases by district courts on political
question grounds, including American Electric decision, were based on misconstruction of doctrine).
170. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 325 (characterizing plaintiffs' claim and rejecting defendants' proposed characterization).
171. See Howe, supra note 155, at 11233 (observing that Second Circuit discussed Baker factors in detail and assessed them independently, while also giving
consideration to doctrine's classical and prudential strands).
172. For an explanation of how the American Electric court properly identified
the scope of plaintiffs' lawsuit, see supra notes 167 and accompanying text.
173. See Howe, supra note 155, at 11237 (describing how Second Circuit
found political question doctrine inapplicable after it determined that adjudicating case would not directly interfere with Executive Branch's international climate
change policy).
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accurately based its conclusion on factors articulated in prior political question cases implicating foreign policy issues.1 74 Specifically,
the court observed that the plaintiffs' claims were not a direct challenge to any foreign policy set by Congress or the President, and
would not impermissibly interfere with the political branches' conduct of foreign relations.17 5
The Second Circuit should have addressed the defendants' argument that the Constitution commits the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause to the political branches, however.17 6 Two years
before the American Electric decision, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Northern California held that the political question doctrine barred a global warming nuisance action, in part because adjudication "would have an inextricable effect on interstate
commerce... [an] issue[ ] constitutionally committed to the political branches of government. "177 Prior to that decision, the Commerce Clause had never been invoked by a court to find a
constitutional commitment to Congress in the political question
context.1 78 Allowing the Commerce Clause, which serves as the
constitutional basis for much of Congress's legislation, to play such
a role in the justiciability analysis would vastly expand the reach of
the political question doctrine. 7 9
Other factors beyond the absence of precedent indicate that
such an application is erroneous. 8 0 For example, in Nixon v. United
States,18 the D.C. Circuit stated that, in the context of analyzing the
first Baker factor, "no one reasonably would suggest that it is beyond
174. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 229-30 (explaining how courts have applied first Baker factor in foreign affairs context by citing numerous cases that
would later be relied on by Second Circuit in American Electric).
175. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 325 n.3 (observing that in many cases where
courts have found nonjusticiable political questions, plaintiffs sued U.S. government or officials and thereby directly challenged political branches' foreign policy). The court explained that the plaintiffs' case, however, "presents at best an
indirect challenge." Id.
176. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's dismissal of the defendants'
Commerce Clause argument, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
177. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007)
178. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 251 n.4 (1993) (White, J., concurring) (implying that congressional legislation under Commerce Clause is not subject to political question doctrine).
179. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 242 (discussing how Commerce
Clause has been used to justify broad range of federal legislation).
180. For a discussion of other reasons why the use of the Commerce Clause in
California v. Gen. Motors Corp. as a ground for invoking the political question doctrine was legally erroneous, see supra notes 177 and accompanying text.
181. 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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the authority of the courts to review congressional enactments regulating interstate commerce."1 82 Despite the weakness of the defendants' argument in American Electric, the Second Circuit should
have addressed (and rejected) it.18 Doing so could have helped
prevent another district court from erroneously finding that the
Commerce Clause precludes adjudication of climate change nuisance claims.18 4
The American Electric court's analysis of the second Baker factor,
which asks whether a manageable standard exists by which the judiciary can resolve the case, was also well-reasoned. 8 5 By consulting
other Second Circuit precedents, such as Klinghoffer, the court concluded that a claim based in tort is inherently judicially discoverable
and manageable.'8 6 A long line of political question cases further
demonstrate that the unique, complex, or highly politicized nature
of the litigated issue should not control a court's application of the
second Baker factor.' 8 7
By referencing intricate environmental cases including Missouri and Tennessee Copper, the Second Circuit supported its finding
in American Electric that the tort of public nuisance provides a manageable standard for confronting the scientific and political complexities of climate change.18 8 In those cases, the Supreme Court
successfully applied the public nuisance standard to resolve vexing
disputes over interstate water and air pollution involving invisible
pollutants.' 8 9 By implication, these cases established the principle

182. Id. at 254 (explaining that court unequivocally has power to review congressional action under Commerce Clause).
183. For a discussion of why there is no basis in law or policy for applying the
political question doctrine to Commerce Clause cases, see supra notes 176 and
accompanying text.
184. For an example of how the district court misapplied the Commerce
Clause as a basis for finding a political question, see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
185. For a description of why the author believes the Second Circuit's approach to the second Baker factor was well-reasoned, see infra notes 186 and accompanying text.
186. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 328-29 (2d Cir.
2009) (describing facts and holding of Klinghoffer and quoting opinion regarding
how tort law provides clear and well-settled rules for adjudication).
187. LaTourette, supra note 41, at 254 (expressing that second Baker prong
analysis is not based on claim's complexity).
188. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 326-27 (describing facts and holdings of Missouri
and Tennessee Copper while emphasizing scientific complexity of cases).
189. For further discussion of the facts and holdings of Missouri and Tennessee
Copper, see supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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that a complex factual background does not render. a time-tested
judicial standard unmanageable. 9 0
Given the causal complexities and global scope of climate
change, a reasonable person might question whether the facts of
the interstate air and water pollution cases relied upon by the court
were sufficiently similar to the public nuisance action it was deciding.' 9 1 This concern is misplaced because the Second Circuit's determination that GHG emissions are legally indistinguishable from
other air pollutants draws strong support from the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (Massachusetts).192 In this seminal
case, the Court held that GHGs are air pollutants under the Clean
Air Act (CAA) and consequently must be regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) like any other air pollutant.19 3 The Second Circuit, therefore, was justified in finding a
manageable standard for adjudication of the plaintiffs' claim based
on a tort standard with a rich history of application in interstate
pollution litigation.19 4
The Second Circuit's analysis of the third Baker factor, the
need for the court to make an initial policy decision unsuitable for
the judiciary, is particularly important because it was the factor the

190. See May, supra note 163, at 957 (relating rich history of cases in which
federal courts have imposed injunctions against interstate polluters).
191. See, e.g., Matthew Hall, A CatastrophicConundrum, But Not a Nuisance: Why
the JudicialBranch is Ill-Suited to Set Emissions Restrictions on Domestic Energy Producers
Through the Common Law Nuisance Doctrine, 13 CHAP. L. REv. 265, 284 (2010) (contending that "climate change occupies different realm than direct pollution
cases"); John Gray, The Use of Public Nuisance Suits to Address Climate Change: Are
These Really "Ordinary Tort Cases"?, in THE LEGAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 2010
ED.: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING NEW LAWS, AVOIDING LIABILITY, AND ANTicIPATING FuTURE CHANGES FOR CLIENTS (INSIDE THE MINDS) 4 (Aspatore 2010) (argu-

ing that "Second Circuit trivialized climate change suits as 'ordinary tort cases' and
saw little distinction between the geographically discrete air and water pollution
cases of yesteryear and today's planet-wide climate claims").
192. 549 U.S. 497 (2007); seeJoy C. Fuhr, Connecticut v. EPA: The New Normal?,
24 NAT. RESOURCEs & ENv'T 58, 59 (2010) (explaining how Second Circuit's analogy between climate change-causing GHG and traditional air and water pollution
is supported by Massachusetts v. EPA).
193. See Fuhr, supra note 192, at 59 (describing Supreme Court's holding in
Massachusetts and how it relates to Second Circuit's American Electric decision).
194. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 326 (2d Cir.
2009) (arguing that public nuisance tort provides courts with manageable standard to resolve climate change cases because it has been used by federal courts for
nearly two centuries). Conversely, the district court, in its manageability analysis,
allowed the complexity of the claim's subject matter to obscure the traditional
public nuisance theory upon which it was based. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at
262-63.
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district court relied on in finding a political question.19 5 Strong
precedent exists regarding the application of this Baker factor, including the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic.19 6 The Kadic court
focused on the underlying claims asserted by the plaintiffs, rather
than the case's geopolitical context, and concluded that the presence ofjudicially manageable standards "obviates any need to make
initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved for nonjudicial
discretion."1 9 7 Likewise, in Alperin, the Ninth Circuit held that the
court need not make an initial policy decision to resolve the plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims because property law
provided a "concrete legal basis for courts to reach a reasoned decision."1 98 Accordingly, the Second Circuit's finding in American Electric that the presence of the judicially manageable and well-defined
public nuisance tort obviated the need to make an initial policy decision properly reflected courts' traditional application of the third
Baker factor.1 99
Finally, the Second Circuit correctly applied Baker factors four
through six, which collectively ask whether deciding a case would
contradict a political branch's prior decisions and seriously interfere with important governmental interests. 200 In accordance with
these factors, the Second Circuit ascertained whether a ruling restricting the defendants' GHG emissions would conflict with any existing U.S. global warming policy. 20 1 While Congress enacted some
legislation regarding climate change prior to the court's decision,
these laws merely called for studies, monitoring, and reports on
global warming. 20 2 As for the U.S.'s international response to cli195. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that third Baker factor is "particularly pertinent to this
case").
196. See Kadic v. Karadfie, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that existence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating case
can render third Baker factor-whether deciding case requires initial policy decision-inapplicable).
197. Id. (applying third Baker factor to plaintiffs' claims).
198. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing
how property law provides sufficiently manageable standards so third Baker factor
is inapplicable to plaintiffs' claims).
199. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 266 (describing that when claim is
based on judicially manageable legal theory, courts need not wait for a policy decision from political branches).
200. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (relating when Baker factors four through six would
apply).
201. For a discussion of the court's decision regarding whether adjudication
of a climate change action would directly interfere with U.S. foreign policy, see
supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
202. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 279 (summarizing congressional enactments touching on climate change as "predominately exploratory in nature").
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mate change, the district court quoted an EPA statement issued
during George W. Bush's administration. 203 At that time, the EPA
said that a unilateral reduction of domestic GHG emissions could
"weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the [greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies." 2 04
Because these statutes and executive branch policies do not directly address the regulation of carbon emissions, the Second Circuit correctly observed that "there really is no unified policy on
greenhouse gas emissions." 205 Furthermore, even if it were U.S.
policy not to engage in unilateral emissions reductions without concurrent reductions by developing nations, that has no bearing on
the outcome of the analysis. 20 6 A decision by a federal district court
on a public nuisance claim brought by domestic plaintiffs for domestic conduct does not establish a national or internationalemissions policy. 2 07 The Second Circuit, therefore, had a solid basis for
determining that adjudication on the merits of the plaintiffs' climate change action will not directly conflict with any existing U.S.
foreign policy. 2 08
VI.

IMPACT

By allowing the plaintiffs' claims to proceed on the merits, the
Second Circuit's American Electric decision has the potential to
greatly enhance the viability of climate change-based public nui-

There has been no prescriptive legislation regulating GHG emissions, nor has a
law been passed stating that mandatory emissions constraints are unnecessary. See
id.
203. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (providing EPA's position during George W. Bush's administration on international affairs impact of regulating domestic GHG).
204. Id. (quoting EPA statement regarding political, economic, and foreign
relations implications of climate change). That court also observed that the U.S.
Senate refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol after it was signed by President Bill
Clinton on the grounds that the treaty forced developed nations to shoulder the
entire cost of emissions reductions. See id. at 269.
205. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 331-32 (2d Cir. 2009)
(asserting that U.S. lacks GHG emissions policy).
206. See id. at 325 (concluding that court decision in plaintiffs' favor would
not impact U.S. foreign policy).
207. See id. (stating that district court decision on plaintiffs' claim would not
result in unilateral reduction in domestic emissions, even assuming emissions caps
were placed on defendants).
208. For an explanation of the American Electric court's analysis and conclusion that the fourth and sixth Baker factors were well-reasoned and consistent with
precedent, see supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
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sance actions. 209 Prior to this decision, courts dismissed similar
claims at the pleadings stage by invoking the political question doctrine. 210 By finding the doctrine inapplicable, the Second Circuit
removed a previously insurmountable barrier from the path of climate change plaintiffs within that circuit and perhaps nationally. 2 11
A.

American Electric's Likely Effect on Future Climate Change
Actions

The impact of the Second Circuit's decision on public nuisance-based climate change actions will depend largely on how
widely its political question doctrine reasoning is adopted by federal
courts.2 1 2 As of the date of publication, the evidence regarding this
issue is somewhat mixed, but nevertheless indicates that many
courts may find American Electric's analysis persuasive.2 1 3 In Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,214 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California rejected the Second Circuit's
reasoning and held that the political question doctrine barred a
climate change-based public nuisance action.2 15 The Kivalina
plaintiffs filed an appeal, which is presently before the Ninth Circuit. 2 1 6 Conversely, a Fifth Circuit panel in Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA 2 17 adopted substantial aspects of the Second Circuit's political
question reasoning and held that climate change plaintiffs were not
209. See Gray, supra note 191, at 2 (observing that, because of Second Circuit's
decision in American Electric, "prospects for successful climate change litigation
have improved dramatically").
210. See Nancy G. Milburn, Connecticut v. AEP Decision, COLUMBIA J. OF ENvrL.
L. FIELD REPs., (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/articles/connecticut-v-aep-decision (describing how courts traditionally dismissed climate change actions at pleading stage prior to American Electric decision).
211. See May, supra note 163, at 922 (discussing how district courts often invoked political question doctrine against climate change plaintiffs, rendering
cause of action "dead on arrival").
212. See generally Evin A. Gaynor et al., Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating
Federal Common-Law Climate Change Claims, 40 EN'vrL. L. REP. NEwS & ANALYSIS
10845, 1084748 (2010) (discussing implications of Second Circuit's American Electric opinion on other federal courts' approach to climate change litigation).

213. See generally id. at 10850 (describing application of American Electric's reasoning by Fifth Circuit in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA).
214. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
215. See id. at 875-77 (refusing to follow political question doctrine analysis of
Second Circuit in American Electric). In Kivalina, an Alaskan native village brought
an action against oil, energy, and utility companies under the federal common law
of public nuisance. Id. at 868-70. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' GHG
emissions contributed to global warming, which was causing erosion of Arctic sea
ice. Id.
216. See Gaynor, supranote 212, at 10849 (describing Ninth Circuit's current
review of Kivalina).
217. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
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barred by the doctrine. 218 While American Electric has already had
an important impact on the direction of climate change litigation,
this trend will intensify if the Ninth Circuit elects to reverse the district court's decision in Kivalina and adopt American Electric's political question reasoning.2 19
The influence of American Electric will be most directly determined by the Supreme Court's disposition of the case. 220 On December 6, 2010, the Court granted the American Electric defendants'
petition for certiorari. 22 1 The Court also announced Justice Sonia
Sotomayor has recused herself from the case. 2 2 2 justice Sotomayor
was a member of the Second Circuit panel when it heard oral arguments in American Electric.2 23 As in Massachusetts, the vote of Justice
Kennedy will likely determine whether American Electric's political
question analysis survives the high court's review. 224 Given the
recusal of Justice Sotomayor, a four-to-four split, with Justice Kennedy joining the court's three other more liberal justices, may be
the best outcome the plaintiffs and environmental community can
realistically hope for.2 2 5
Also, it must be remembered that the Second Circuit did not
actually rule on the merits of the plaintiffs' public nuisance claim in
218. Id. at 875-79 (following Second Circuit's reasoning in American Electric by
holding political question doctrine did not bar adjudication of plaintiffs' claim).
The Comer defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc in the Fifth Circuit
and rehearing was granted on February 26, 2010. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at
10849. On the date the Fifth Circuit was to hear the appeal, the court lacked a
quorum and determined that under its own precedent, it could not hear the Comer
appeal en banc. Id. at 10849-50. As a result, the court determined that its only
option was to dismiss the appeal altogether and permit the district court's dismissal
of the case to stand. Id. at 10850.
219. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10849 (discussing implications of Ninth
Circuit's forthcoming review of Kivalina on future of climate change litigation).
220. See id. at 10850 (observing that if Supreme Court refuses to grant petition for certiorari, "industry can anticipate an avalanche of climate change-related
federal nuisance actions").
221. Steven D. Cook, Climate Change: U.S. Supreme Court to HearUtility Challenge
to Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Suit, BNA's Toxics LAw REPORTER: Toxic TORTs, Dec. 9,
2010, available at 2010 WL 4925992. (reporting that Court granted certiorari to
defendants in American Electric).
222. See id. (observing that Justice Sotomayor took no part in decision to
grant certiorari).
223. See id. (explaining Justice Sotomayor's role in American Electric prior to
her nomination to Supreme Court).
224. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10850 (asserting that Supreme Court will
likely be divided as in Massachussetts v. EPA, "with all eyes once again turned to
Justice Anthony Kennedy").
225. For a discussion ofJustice Sotomayor's recusal and the resulting expectation that the Court will be divided, with justice Kennedy playing the decisive role,
see supra notes 222 and accompanying text.
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American Electric.2 26 Therefore, in order for the plaintiffs to obtain
the relief they requested, they must still prove the defendants' GHG
emissions constitute an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public. 22 7 This feat will not be easily accomplished given the difficulty of proving causation in the context of a
global problem caused by manifold, diffuse emitters.22 8 There is
nevertheless reason to believe it may be possible for the American
Electric plaintiffs, and similarly situated future plaintiffs, to prevail
on the merits of their public nuisance claim.22 9
B.

Possible Displacement of Federal Common Law by Recent
EPA Actions

In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts
that the EPA essentially must regulate GHGs under the CAA, the
agency has recently issued two important rules. 23 0 These EPA actions may ultimately affect the outcome of American Electric on appeal, as well as the status of future climate change lawsuits based on
federal nuisance law.23 1 The two new rules are the endangerment
finding under section 202 (a) of the CAA and the Tailoring Rule for
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permit programs. 232
In the EPA's December 15, 2009 endangerment finding, a precursor to regulation under the mobile sources provisions of the
CAA, Administrator Lisa Jackson concluded that GHGs endanger
both public health and welfare by contributing to global warming.23 3 On May 7, 2010, the EPA published its first regulation of
226. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claim on political
question grounds).
227. See id. at 315-16 (summarizing court's holding).
228. See Christopher R. Reeves, Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case for
Causation, 32 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 495, 503-07 (2009) (discussing difficulty of proving causation for plaintiffs in climate change tort actions).
229. See generally id. at 508-23 (discussing various theories plaintiffs could potentially use to prove causation in climate change actions).
230. For a discussion of recent EPA regulations and their potential impact on
climate change litigation, see infra notes 231 and accompanying text.
231. See Gaynor, supranote 212, at 10853 (noting that EPA recently issued two
important rules regarding regulation of GHGs under Clean Air Act).
232. See id. (stating names of two rules recently promulgated by EPA).
233. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66497 (Dec.
15, 2009) (summarizing EPA Administrator's finding that GHGs endanger public
health and welfare).
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mobile source GHG emissions.2 3 4 Due to the CAA's structure, once
the EPA issues and makes effective a regulation of GHG emissions
under any section of the Act, the requirements of the CAA's PSD
and Title V programs automatically become applicable to the GHG

emissions of stationary sources. 23 5 These programs are particularly
important to the issue of whether federal nuisance actions against
large GHGs emitters will be displaced because they require any stationary source emitting more than a certain threshold of a regulated pollutant to obtain a permit.2 3 6 On May 13, 2010, the EPA
explained it would implement the PSD and Title V programs by
issuing a final "tailoring" rule.2 3 7 The rule states that, beginning on
January 2, 2011, the EPA will apply the CAA's stationary source permitting requirements to the largest GHG emitters such as power
plants, cement production facilities, and refineries.2 38
Now that the Tailoring Rule has gone into effect, some courts
may find that its permitting requirements displace federal nuisance

litigation against large stationary sources of GHG emissions.23 9 Further implementation, however, could be delayed or precluded depending on the results of lawsuits filed by industry groups and
certain states challenging the legality of the EPA's recent GHG reg-

234. Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (increasing
CAFE standards and imposing GHG emissions limitations on passenger cars and
light-duty trucks); see also Reconsideration of Interpretationof Regulations that Determine
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, EPA, 94 (Mar. 29, 2010)
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd memorecon_032910.pdf (noting that
vehicle emissions requirements will go into effect on January 2, 2011).
235. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10853 (explaining how regulation of new
pollutant under any provision of CAA triggers requirement that EPA begin to regulate stationary sources of pollutant under PSD and Title V programs).
236. See Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Bianco, What to Expect from EPA: Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENvrL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIs 10480, 10481 (2010) (describing role of PSD and Title V permitting requirements in regulation of large stationary sources under CAA).
237. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (June 1, 2010).
238. See id. at 31516 (providing details regarding implementation schedule by
which PSD and Title V permit programs will be applied to stationary source GHG
emitters); see also EPA's FinalTailoringRule: Its Future and Implications,COVINcTON &
BURLING LLP, 1 (May 20, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/56a039bc6ac7-40c5-b7a2-9f1 317d2b9b4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 743db5fe-73
1d-46b3-8eef-ab907cfl 3dbO/EPA%2OFinal%2OTailoring%2ORule%20-%201ts%20
Future%20and%20Implications.pdf (explaining types of business entities that will
be subject to the PSD and Title V permitting programs under Tailoring Rule).
239. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10854 (noting that Tailoring Rule's application of PSD and Title V permit programs to large stationary sources could preempt future climate change litigation).
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ulations. 240 Furthermore, even if the regulations are upheld, their
effect on climate change litigation will probably be modest because
courts are unlikely to interpret them as preempting nuisance actions brought under state law. 241 Nevertheless, when the Supreme
Court reviews American Electric, it may well find that the EPA's regulatory activity has sufficiently displaced the federal nuisance action
presented in this case.242
C.

Impact of Decision on the United States' Regulation of
Carbon Emissions

Public nuisance litigation is hardly an optimal method for the
U.S. to regulate and reduce its GHG emissions.2 4 3 Comprehensive
legislation establishing a framework for regulating emissions would
achieve larger GHG reductions at a lower social cost than would a
series of multifarious court decisions. 244 Due to the politically polarizing debate surrounding climate change and the quasi-legislative relief sought by the plaintiffs in American Electric, the Second
Circuit's decision will be criticized by some as stepping beyond the
proper role of the Judiciary.2 4 5
Nevertheless, American Electric could provide a significant spur
to comprehensive federal legislation regulating GHGs, particularly
if more circuits choose to adopt the Second Circuit's political ques240. See id. (observing that Tailoring Rule and vehicle GHG emissions standards have been challenged on several fronts and may not go into effect for years);
see also Industrial Groups Target EPA Over Clean Air Act Rule, 30 No. 20 WEsTLAw J.
ENVrL. 1 (Apr. 29, 2010) (describing Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation v. EPA lawsuit filed by agricultural and mining groups challenging EPA's Tailoring Rule).
The Tailoring Rule's greatest legal vulnerability is that the explicit statutory language of the CAA sets clear PSD and Title V permitting thresholds at a level substantially lower than the 75,000 tons of emission-per-year level selected by the EPA
for regulating GHGs. See COVINcTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 238, at 3.
241. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10857 (observing that in past years, "even
in areas where the EPA has been deemed to occupy the field with CAA regulations,
states have [successfully] brought common-law nuisance challenges for the impacts
of interstate pollution").
242. For a discussion of the EPA's recent regulatory actions under the Clean
Air Act toward GHG emissions from mobile and stationary sources, see supra note
231 and accompanying text.
243. See May, supra note 163, at 952-53 (noting that few consider public nuisance-based climate change litigation to be more socially efficient means of regulating GHG emissions than legislation).
244. See Hall, supranote 191, at 293-95 (suggesting regulating GHG emissions
through "piecemeal litigation against specific contributing entities" would be far
less efficient and desirable than comprehensive climate change legislation enacted
by Congress).
245. See Lexington: A Refreshing Dose of Honesty, supra note 163, at 69 (discussing
how climate change issue is politically divisive and partisan).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011

35

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6

356 VILLANOVA

ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. XXII:

p. 321

tion analysis. 246 The threat of liability for carbon emissions through
adverse federal district court decisions could provide power and energy companies with a strong incentive to lobby Congress to enact a
more uniform and predictable statute regulating GHG emissions.24 7 These industries have been instrumental in obstructing
the passage of climate change legislation through an intensive lobbying and public relations campaign. A change in their cost-benefit
analysis regarding carbon emissions regulation could substantially
improve the chances that such legislation will be enacted.2 4 8
Michael Schiraldi*
246. See Hall, supra note 191, at 294 (noting that Second Circuit's decision
may spur long-awaited action by the Executive and Legislative Branches regarding
regulation of GHG emissions).
247. See id. at 294-96 (discussing how threat of litigation may lead energy companies and trade groups to lobby Congress for comprehensive legislation).
248. See id. (explaining how energy companies have played influential role in
obstructing passage of climate change legislation).
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Bates
College.
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